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Abstract 
This is a discussion of research findings on the interaction of the Japanese firms 
with Australia’s locational factors that affect their investment decisions in 
Australia.   The paper argues that there is a convergence as well as divergence 
among the sixty-five companies from three industrial sectors on ten different 
factors affecting satisfaction that is reported by the management and the other 
variables that characterise the firms.1 
 
 
Japan-Australia relations: Introduction 
Japan has always captured the imagination of Australian business leaders and 
politicians (Stockwin 1972, Meaney 1988) and economic planners (Japan 
Secretariat 1984) in the post-war era.  In the Japanese media the image of Australia 
is one of a tourist location and raw materials supplier that buys cars and 
electronics goods from Japan (The Japan Times 2001: 15). Australian exports to 
Japan add up to 380,000 jobs, AUS $1,300 for every Australian, and 4% of the GDP 
(Vaile 2001). Australia has always been fascinated with Japan’s apparent strength 
in determining domestic business policy for outward-bound expansion in the 
boom period of the 1980s (Japan Secretariat 1986, Australia-Japan Relations 
Symposium 1986, 1988). The relationship between the two countries has been a 
distinct consideration in shaping Australian responses to regional economic 
affairs (Crawford and Okita 1976, Toyama and Tisdell 1991).  The economic links 
between the two countries have often resembled a mirror image of the global 
developments.  In the early 1980s, Japan and Australia exhibited effective and 
substantial joint leadership in the process that led to the establishment of APEC 
that was a significant achievement among all the globalisation currents.  
“Their...regional profiles helped Tokyo and Canberra cooperate in soliciting a 
regional consensus about the value of the regional institution for multilateral 
cooperation, not only for Asian countries but also for the United States" (Soeya 
2001: 23). In the growth environment of the 1980s many scenarios that included 
visions of great potential for Australia’s resources and Japanese ‘know-how’ 
became redundant.  One ‘if only…’ scenario in Australia-Japan relations was the 
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failure of MFO (multi function polis) project.  Multi Function Polis was 
prematurely celebrated by Japan experts in Australia (Inkster 1991) and journalists 
(Hamilton 1991) and was subsequently abandoned due to several factors none the 
least was the end of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’.  The cancellation of the project 
proved to be major letdown for the planners, politicians, academics and the 
business world alike (Parker 1998).  The project was seen as a failed attempt of 
technology transfer that was going to be significantly different from the usual 
foreign direct investment concerns between Australia and Japan (Tsuru 1993: 202).  
In the 2000s the two governments noticed a bilateral lapse in the interest in the 
relationship and a neglect of the bilateral links.  This resulted in major official 
initiatives.  The report, which was produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (De Bouver and Warren 2001) looked at the topic from the point of 
view of trade management and liberalisation.  Further, a monograph became the 
end result of a Senate sub-committee inquiry into the relative lack of recent 
initiative on the Australia-Japan relations (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade References Committee 2000).    It became apparent that a concerted effort by 
the two parties to find a new medium for economic linkages was on the way. 
Around the same time another report that was commissioned by Tokyo compared 
the relationship to a long-term marriage where the partners "have no real strong 
interest in each other" (The Japan Times 2001: 15).  The marriage allegory must be 
transmigratory as the report commissioned by Canberra also defined the link as 
being of "interest in each other [that was] waning" (de Bouver and Warren 2001).   
Japanese economy has been recently likened to a phoenix due to its apparent 
ability to regenerate as it has over four decades ago which was an achievement the 
nation is tipped to repeat (Katz 2003a, 2003b).  There are indications that corporate 
restructuring in the Japanese manufacturing and construction sectors have been 
completed (Deutsche Bank 2003) and that the banking system is coming to the end 
of its bad loan write-offs (Perennial Investment Partners 2003) hence possibly 
creating the conditions for a Japan Mark II by 2006.  It is reported that Australia’s 
biggest trade partner is tipped to grow 3 percent in 2004 and there is hope Japan 
can return to being a dynamic force (Lunn 2003: 17). Globalised and globalising 
kaisha and their overseas activities remain relevant.  It has been viewed previously 
that Japan is located in a region with high concentration of growth triangles that are 
fast evolving transnational economic zones (Tang 1998).  Their evolution has 
interacted with keiretsu networks also has irreversibly modified even the 
Australian business practices (Shelton 1995).    
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Japanese Business 
Japanese MNEs have adapted to the foreign business environment in the last two 
decades.  How they continue to adapt and what they think as satisfactory business 
conditions for continued investment remain important research questions. The 
research on MNEs significantly identify Japanese firms as making use of business 
strategy that are far more global in comparison to other nations’ multinationals 
(Gnan and Songini 1995).  Japanese MNE activity remains relevant despite the 
‘lost decade’. Japanese business system may, in fact, develop to be a global 
standard.  Its proven success, durability and adaptability can put it ahead of the 
US and European models (Beeson 1998: 249).  It has been over a decade since the 
publication of The Australian Economy in the Japanese Mirror by Professor Kyoko 
Sheridan (1992).  Since then, the changes in Australian economy and the 
composition of capital have been significant (Bayari 2001c) as the economy has 
been ‘reformed’ by the lowering of the tariffs and the removal/reduction of 
industry protection throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Frankel 1997: 15).  The 
economy is today more open than most of its trading partners in Asia and 
opening further (Richardson 1999). The liberalisation of the economy has 
implications for the Japanese MNEs that are in Australia, especially the 
manufacturers.  There are factors that can be analysed in terms of the satisfaction 
of the firms that they affect. Based on the discussions of previous research this 
paper focuses on ten locational factors that are below discussed by using the data 
collected from sixty-five companies.2 
 
Japanese Trade  
The historical trend in Japan-Australia trade relations is one of steady nature.  
Australia has continuously a net surplus and exports predominantly ‘Crude 
materials, inedible, except fuels’ and ‘Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials’ and imports among other things mainly ‘Machinery and transport 
equipment’ which is displayed in ‘Table: Japan-Australia Trade, Exports and 
Imports by Commodity’.  Table 1 shows the last decade of the trade figures 
whereby it can be observed that (highlighted in grey) the bulk of the exports as 
well as imports are of the same nature.  It is also important to recall how this point 
was arrived at.  Exports to Japan increased significantly after 1973 when the UK 
entered EC literally ending two centuries of preferential treatment for the 
Australian exports as a result of its obligation to EEC tariffs (Toida et al. 1994). 
Table 2 shows the significant change between the export and imports figures for 
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Japan and the UK from 1960-61 to 1970-1971.  As the UK’s preferential link with 
Australia was severed a new line was established with Japan’s growing need of 
supply of reliable high-volume exports from nearby regions.  Japanese sogo shosha 
(general trading companies) manage a large percentage of Australia’s trade with 
Japan (CEDA 1997: 54). Japan is Australia's largest trading partner however, 
Australian economy's share of Japanese imports has been shrinking since 1991.  
This is due to the fact that Japan’s imports are increasingly in the manufactured 
goods while primary commodities dominate Australian exports to Japan (Bayari 
2000a).  While Japanese trading companies have been operating in Australia for a 
long time, some over a century, they have been reluctant to invest in 
manufacturing and remained as trade agents.3  
 
Japanese investment  
The United Kingdom is the first country that dominated fdi in Australia, which 
was surpassed by the USA in the postwar years as the major investor, while Japan 
became the third biggest investor.  Intense targeting of local consumption was the 
reason for the investment from the United States and Japan (Beeson 1997, 
Drysdale 1993).  Japan has been the most important destination for the Australian 
exports of natural resources in postwar period but Australia is perceived as a 
sparse market for foreign investment that is far from major population centres 
(Johns 1994: 442).  This is treated in detail below in the discussion of location 
factors.  Japanese non-manufacturing investment made up ninety per cent of the 
total Japanese fdi as reported in an earlier study (Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994: 
2).  The manufacturing fdi in Australia by Japanese MNEs has been crucial but 
quite insignificant compared to Japanese involvement in mining, finance and 
banking, service industries and real estate.  
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Chart 1: Japanese Direct Investment as % of the Total Japanese Investment 
 
 
Data Source: Compiled from ABS 5352.0 (2003) International Investment Position 
Supplementary Country Statistics. 
 
The collapse of the so-called ‘bubble economy’ reduced the Japanese MNEs fdi in 
Australia and during the 1990s Australia's share of overall Japanese investment 
continually declined (JETRO 1995).4  Second half of the 1980s had witnessed a 
surge in the number of Japanese MNEs in the tertiary sectors of finance, insurance, 
property and business services (AJEI 1989: ii). Finance and insurance companies, 
which at one point represented a higher percentage of the fdi, came to Australia to 
service their Japanese clients as a part of the parent's internationalisation strategy 
in a growing and liberalised investment market (Nicholas et al. 1996a: 10).   
However, Japanese banking and insurance companies withdrew from overseas 
markets, including Australia, in great numbers, by the end of 1990s as they lacked 
international competitiveness (Kiyota 2001).  The composition of the Japanese fdi 
in Australia (Table 3) has been dominated by securities portfolios since 1991 in 
line with Australian market deregulation in the late 1980s after which Japanese 
finance and insurance MNEs entered the Australian financial sector (Drysdale 
1993, Tsuru 1993, Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994). Comprehensive data of the 
types of industries in which Japanese companies invest Australia is currently not 
available, however total investment amounts, divided into direct investment, 
portfolio investment and financial derivatives, are collected and collated by 
Australian Bureau of Statistics per investing country.5  Foreign investment levels 
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in Australia stood at $844.5 billion at the end of the 2002 financial year and the top 
five investors in Australia were as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Foreign Investment Levels in Australia6 
 
 
Data Source: Compiled from ABS (2003) 5352.0 International Investment Position 
Supplementary Country Statistics 
 
The Bureau also publishes Private Capital Expenditure and Expected Expenditure 
5625.0 which does not distinguish between the countries though a trial publication 
was attempted in 2001 that was entitled ‘Ownership characteristics of business 
undertaking capital expenditure in Australia, 1998-1999’. Even though there were 
no subsequent publications the trial publication highlighted significant differences 
between different states in terms of the investment types (mining, manufacturing 
and others) and the country of origin. The only information that was specifically 
related to Japanese investment was the statement that ‘Japanese owned-firms 
made…significant contribution’ (ABS 2001: 2) and that ‘there was significant 
Japanese investment in Queensland, but less Japanese investment in other states’ 
(ABS 2001: 3). What the data in Chart 1 shows in terms of the Japanese direct 
investment is that in the last eleven years it has fluctuated between 29 per cent 
and 39 per cent of the total Japanese investment. The composition of foreign 
investment in Australia has changed rapidly in the last decade and although a 
comparison between Japan and other countries may be interesting it would also 
be misleading as the differences between volume of transactions from different 
countries are vast.  Japanese direct investment as percentage of the total Japanese 
investment has been generally on the increase since 1997-1998 after a brief decline 
after 1994-1995 (Chart 1). This highlights the importance of researching what, as in 
the discussion of ten business factors in this paper, are the most satisfactory 
aspects of doing business in Australia. 
 
MNE Theory 
The multinational enterprise is a product of global economic environment.  MNE 
theories explain numerous phenomena that arise from MNE activity. Dunning's 
eclectic paradigm has been built, over several decades, as a theoretical framework 
Origin Investment % of the total 
USA $242.1 billion 29% 
UK $223.9 billion 27% 
Japan  $48.0 billion 6% 
Hong Kong $39.4 billion 5% 
Singapore  $31.9 billion  4% 
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that encompasses several elements from other theories (Harzing 1999, Purcell et 
al. 1999a; Nicholas et  al. 1996a, 1998). Dunning argues that three conditions have 
to be met before an MNE engages in foreign production: 
 (1)  It possesses net O [ownership-specific-my addition] advantages 
vis-a-vis  firms of other nationalities in serving particular markets.  These O 
advantages largely take the form of the possession of tangible assets or of the 
advantages of common governance 
 (2) it must be more beneficial to the enterprise possessing these 
advantages to use them (or their output) itself… through an extension of its 
existing value added chains or the adding of new ones.  These advantages are 
called internalization (I) advantages. 
 (3) Assuming conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, it must be in the global 
interests of the enterprise to utilize these advantages in conjunction with at least 
some factor inputs (including natural resources) outside its home country.  These 
advantages are termed the locational (L) advantages of countries. (Dunning 1988c 
26) 
 
Dunning argues that all international production can be explained by different 
configuration or interaction of these conditions.  There are several other 
theoretical constructions for understanding MNE activities that are not 
incompatible.  Caves suggests that brand name or trademark is a core asset which 
a firm can use as an organisational advantage to be a successful MNE (Caves 
1974).  Kojima argues that MNEs can be agents of exchange for what they lack and 
what the host nation needs (Kojima 1993). MNEs are thus companies that use their 
own capital and other tangible and intangible assets (Dunning 1971). The 
difference between an MNE and the domestic firms of the same nation lies in the 
act of MNE's internalising previously external markets via fdi (Enderwick 1982: 
76). MNEs are identified by being present in more than one country's production 
facilities of any kind (Dunning 1971, 1974a, 1985).7  Vernon's product cycle paradigm 
refers to the lead of innovation that provides the firm with an advantage of 
exports and fdi to exploit the profit opportunity, and fdi takes place in context of 
matured product and standardised production process that takes advantage of 
these to produce behind tariff walls (Vernon 1966).  Vernon’s suggestion that 
MNEs play an active role in adapting and standardising products as they advance 
to maturity is compatible with the eclectic theory (Casson 1991: 374).  Porter focuses 
on the link between the strategies that MNEs utilise and the competitive 
advantages of their host nations that is a transfer of indigenous competitive 
qualities via MNE activity into the international arena (Porter 1990: 71-72). Market 
situation is hence inevitably linked to MNE theory as in Hymer’s argument that 
domestic firms, of a particular, that grew to be international had certain 
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monopolistic advantages to begin with.  Such firms carry out fdi to gain 
monopoly of the domestic markets of other nations and to earn the highest 
possible benefit hence the international firm supersedes or internalizes the market 
via fdi (Hymer 1960: 48).  Aliber suggests that MNEs must posses advantages to 
overcome the incurring of additional costs associated with their fdi (Aliber 1970: 
127) and that MNEs of nations with stronger currencies have such advantages 
over companies of weak currency nations (Aliber 1970: 137-138).   Though it is not 
compatible with the eclectic paradigm, Aliber's thesis does not explain why the 
currency strength would be sufficient as an ownership advantage while many 
MNEs compete with advantages other than strong currency (Dunning 1988a: 49-
50). The eclectic paradigm of Dunning and the internationalisation theory of Casson 
converge on the premise that MNE fdi creates production and trade, which should 
be seen in an integrated framework, even if such an analysis would require 
further factor inputs (Dunning 1993a, Casson 1991). Hence, the eclectic theory and 
the internationalisation theory of MNE are often assessed in conjunction with each 
other (Clegg 1987: 1).  The eclectic paradigm and the internationalisation and 
internalisation (of previously external markets) paradigms intersect.  
Internalization as a factor and outcome of fdi is utilised by several authors 
(Dunning 1988h, Casson 1991, Rugman 1987, 1990) and refers to international 
market activity of a MNE and that “proprietary firm specific advantages yield 
economic rents when exploited on world-wide basis" (Rugman 1990: 17).  
However, the eclectic paradigm is a more extensive and much larger system that it 
actually incorporates ownership, location an internationalisation advantages (OLI) 
while embracing the essential features of the internationalisation paradigm 
(Dunning 1997 334).  This is because the eclectic paradigm assumes ownership 
advantages to be a determinant of foreign production while the 
internationalisation paradigm treats it as exogenous variable (Dunning 1993b: 
252).  There are several non-economic organisational advantages within the OLI 
paradigm and that country-specific political, legal, ideological and cultural 
differences may fundamentally affect the ability of firms to generate and sustain 
competitive advantages (Dunning 1988b: 320).  This may well be the case with the 
Japanese MNEs in Australia which are parts of larger keiretsu networks that have 
been in doing business here for decades.  Their non-economic organizational 
advantages could partially explain their continuous presence here even though 
further research is necessary to formalize the locational factors discussed in this 
paper with more data. 
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Data Summary 
The survey data consisted of sixty-five Japanese companies from three sectors as 
displayed in Table 5 and 6.   
 
Table 5: Distribution of the firms 
 
 
Among the respondents, electronics and sogo shosha was the most common 
which auto-parts, automakers and banks followed.  The variety among the 
respondent companies shows the extent of the economic interdependency 
between Japan and Australia.  Only two per cent of the respondents were joint 
ventures with rest being fully Japanese owned businesses.  A great majority of the 
respondents (65 per cent) had recorded their largest expansion in 1990-2000 with 
twenty-three per cent having achieved the same result in 1980-1989. 
 
Table 6: Industry type and staff number (%)8 9 
 
 
The contribution of the manufacturing and assembly sector to the employment is 
apparent in the results displayed in Table 6 in which a great majority of the firms 
from the two other sectors have staff numbers that are less than 100 people.  
Seventy-eight per cent of the firms from the marketing and sales (M&S) sector had 
staff less than 100 compared to 75% of those from the service sector (S) and 22% of 
the firms from the manufacturing and assembly (M&A) sector.  The even division 
of the manufacturing and assembly firms between the periods of pre-1984 and 
post-1984 possibly signifies that the deregulation in the 1980s had a role to play in 
this sector. 
Company Type % 
Auto 6 
Auto-parts 9 
Banking 6 
Electronics 15 
Food & agriculture 3 
Insurance 2 
IT 3 
Other manufacture 6 
Other marketing 14 
Other service 17 
Plastics/rubber 3 
Sogo shosha 12 
Tourism 3 
Total 100 
 
Staff  No M&A M&S S 
<100 22 78 75 
>=100 78 22 25 
Total 100 100 100 
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Table 7: Industry type and market-entry year (%) 
 
 
The increase in the number of Japanese tourism, banking and finance MNEs in the 
post-deregulation Australia is reflected in the survey results whereby 65% of the 
surveyed firms in the Service sector were set up in the period 1984-and after.  This 
may have been also due to the decade of the ‘bubble’ economy in Japan where the 
limitations for domestic investment was duly reached in the coinciding period.  
The percentage for the marketing and sales sector that were post 1984 entrants 
was much smaller for the same period at 26%.  This may signify that this sector 
does not rely on the elements of the market that were deregulated and that the 
market was suitably served by these firms through means other than foreign 
investment.   
 
Market  Entry M&A M&S S 
pre-1984 50 74 45 
1984-and later 50 26 55 
Total 100 100 100 
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The Analysis of the Variables10 
The topics and the issues this paper is analysing are part of a large assembly of 
factors that foreign companies find in the economies, Australia in this instance, 
which they invest.   The paper analyses the variable in the framework of the 
historical development of the issues or the varying relevance of the factors to each 
sector.  Below, the paper will look at the three-sector distribution of the business 
satisfaction and convergent and divergent trends among the variables (Charts 2).11 
Table 8: Means, standard deviations for three sectors12 
 
 
 
Support from parent company  
Japanese MNE structures operate on the acute division of parent/subsidiary 
separated into further managerial units, unique to their global organisation which 
makes continuous support necessary (Aoki 2000: 135-137).  Support from parent 
company is a crucial factor in foreign investment and was found to be most 
relevant for the subsidiaries’ top management in instances where localisation of 
the middle management occur as per an earlier study of Japanese firms in 
Australia (Jackson 1991: 109).  Even if a MNE subsidiary can be identified with the 
host country there still exists a ‘distance’ (psychic distance) between the subsidiary 
and the foreign investment location (Dunning 1971: 46). Support from homebase 
is positively correlated to this ‘distance’.  The wider the gap the higher the need 
for support from HQ, which is observed to be most relevant for manufacturing 
and assembly firms.  
 
Variables  M&A M&S S 
SUPPORT  M 1.2222 1.5926 1.4444 
  SD 0.6468 0.9306 0.8944 
TRANSPORT  M 1.8333 1.5556 1.2222 
  SD 0.9852 0.8473 0.6831 
INDUSTRIAL R. M 1.8333 1.7778 2.1000 
  SD 0.9852 0.8916 0.9119 
TRADELINKS  M 1.5000 1.5185 1.8000 
  SD 0.7859 0.7000 0.6959 
UNION-MANAGEMENT M 1.7222 1.8519 1.9500 
  SD 0.8264 0.4560 0.2236 
MARKET  M 2.6667 2.6296 2.6500 
  SD 0.7670 0.7415 0.6708 
FEDSUPPORT  M 1.8333 1.8889 1.9500 
  SD 0.8575 0.7511 0.6048 
GST  M 2.1667 2.1111 2.3500 
  SD 0.9852 0.9337 0.8751 
TARIFFS M 2.1667 1.8519 2.0500 
  SD 0.8575 0.8182 0.2236 
DISTANCE  M 2.3889 1.9259 2.0000 
  SD 0.7775 0.6752 0.5620 
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Chart 2: Japanese MNEs and satisfaction levels with ten factors 
 
 
In a previous study, the variable ‘part of worldwide operations’ had scored 2.9 
(manufacturing sector), 3.5 (finance sector) and 2.7 (tourism sector) respectively in 
terms of its importance as a competitive advantage (Purcell 1999: 75).13  This 
signifies the process of financial integration as the chief dynamic of globalisation.  
In fact in the same survey the ‘parent firm’s reputation’ was also given as a 
competitive advantage of the highest importance again by the finance companies 
(Purcell 1999: 75).  In the present survey the SUPPORT variable had the highest 
reported satisfaction by the manufacturing and assembly sector (78%), followed 
by the service sector firms (74%) and the firms in the marketing and sales firms 
(70%) in Chart 2.14  The subsidiaries can import the ownership advantages of their 
parent companies (Dunning 1988c: 115).  While Japanese MNEs transfer work 
practices to Australia through foreign investment they also transfer technology 
through their subsidiaries.  Surveys have shown these transfers to be of "state of 
the art technology" compared to the technology the UK and USA MNEs brought 
into Australia (Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994, Nicholas et al. 1996a). Such 
transfers reflect a deliberate strategy by the Japanese parent to design and an 
optimal structure within the subsidiary that allows the parent to exploit the 
competitive advantages that led it to invest in Australia most efficiently (Purcell et 
al. 1999: 74-75).  The importance of support from home for the Japanese MNEs in 
Australia is obvious.  The Japanese MNEs in Australia chose to internalise the 
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technology, instead of licensing or selling it outright, hence fully utilising the 
ownership advantages of asset kind. The success of this is correlated with the 
support levels.  Marketing and sales sector enjoys the highest support level, 
followed by service and assembly and manufacture sectors which reflect the 
actual amount of support they require for maintaining investment (Table 8).15  The 
necessity for continuous high capital outlay and the concentration of high staff 
numbers (Table 6), assembly and manufacture sector has the highest financial 
dependence on the parent firm, followed, for the same reasons, by the service 
sector firms. Marketing and sales sector has the lowest concentration of firms with 
staff of over 100 (Table 6) in tri-sector distribution. It also has the least need of 
capital injection and the smallest degree of dependence on the parent, hence the 
highest levels of satisfaction.  
 
Transport in and out of Australia16 
 
In a previous survey of Japanese MNEs, in a scale of importance from low (1) to 
high (9) import duties got a high score of 6.3.  The other scores were: transport 
costs (5.6), government policy (5.3), non-tariff barriers (5.1), energy costs (4.6) with 
Australian wage rates (3.8) and industrial relations (2.9) both ranking low 
(Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994: 8-9). Thus, in previous research the transport 
factors was found to be the second most important factor, possibly due to the 
prior history of waterfront conflicts.  In the present survey, for the manufacturing 
and assembly firms, TRANSPORT scored 89 per cent satisfaction. This is followed 
by the marketing and sales sector and service sectors at 75 per cent each which 
indicates a higher level of reliance on transport in and out of Australia.  It is 
difficult to sustain a theory about which factors can be combined to measure the 
attractiveness of further Japanese foreign investment in Australia given that 
factors such as wage rates and industrial relations have very low scores.  These are 
several ideological thrusts of the international management discourse that 
explains the lack of ‘charm’ of the Australian manufacturing to international 
investors.17  However Australia’s reliance on shipping lines, none of which is 
nationally owned, is a business factor like no other.  Manufacturing and transport 
have the highest degree of co-dependence.  Reducing transport costs is one reason 
Toyota tried to eliminate components sourced from Japan from its cars in the past 
three years, scouring the industry for alternative components in a bid to make 
Altona plant ‘a yen-free zone’“ (Asano 2002: 24).  As a result, the company was 
able to increase local value added production (parts and costs) from 75 per cent to 
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83 per cent (Porter 2002: 24).  A sector with significant transport costs is mining.  
The export share of mine ores is high and when coupled with the high levels of 
foreign ownership in this sector the importance of transports costs become clear.  
In fact in some ore mining sectors foreign ownerships is high, as is the case with 
gold mines whose the foreign ownership is seventy per cent, having risen from a 
mere twenty per cent in 1997 (AAP 2002: 24).  Transport is bound to remain as a 
crucial variable for foreign business and it contributes to the satisfaction levels in 
variables quite significantly as a direct cost. 
      
Industrial relations  
There are significant differences between the industries where Japanese MNEs are 
present in Australia in terms of the number of unions at workplace and the levels 
of unionisation (Bayari 2001a).  In this survey, the level of satisfaction for 
industrial relations (56%) was significantly lower than that of union-management 
relations (75%) which suggests that while the MNEs have achieved a level of 
consensus with their workforce they have a strong preference for a ‘less 
restrictive’ framework for employment contracts.  The psychological contracts, an 
amalgam of subjective experiences, sociologically, historically and personally, are 
country specific (Rousseau and Schalk 2000).  Australian industrial relations have 
been transformed in the last two decades, since the beginning of the deregulatory 
economics by the Hawke government, to the detriment of union power and the 
historical construct of the centralised arbitration and wage fixing (Wooden 2000). 
Japanese industrial relations system, also with a central legal framework has been 
described as ‘harmonious’ and ‘based on mutual trust’ though its collective 
bargaining is overwhelmingly at firm level (Nakabuko 1999, Nakata 1999).  
Additionally Japanese labour market has a historical duality whereby large 
sections of employees’ work in seasonal and contract work with lower wages and 
no benefits, in jobs are easily distinguishable by the lack of union presence (Bayari 
2002).  The main reason for the higher score with the satisfaction in industrial 
relations in Australia may lie in the perception of the employers that in the current 
climate further labour ‘reform’ appears plausibly to be within reach.  The survey 
results indicate that the marketing and sales sector has the highest level of 
satisfaction (64%) followed by the manufacturing and assembly (59%) and service 
sectors (44%). Previous research on the Japanese subsidiaries in Australia that 
looked at competitive advantages found that ‘industrial relations’ scored 3.2 out of 
4 in terms of importance for manufacturing sector and 2.7 for financial sector with 
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no results for the tourism sector companies that were also surveyed (Purcell et al. 
1999: 75).  The emphasis that is placed upon industrial relations by different 
sectors is common to the present and the prior study. 
     
Australia's economic and trade links with other nations 
Dunning makes a clear association between links of trade and foreign direct 
investment.  "[T]rade and investment, far from being substitutes for each other, 
often go hand in hand…In trade, the final decision of what is produced and where 
it is produced is taken within the exporting or importing country; in international 
investment, decisions may be taken outside the country in which they are 
implemented and their effect chiefly felt" (Dunning 1988b: 205).  Consequently, it 
is necessary to include the tradelinks of the host nation in conjunction with the 
foreign investment levels of the foreign company.  The perception Japanese 
companies have of Australia has been raised previously in terms of continuity of 
the direct investment in relation to several factors including its business links 
(Sekine 1991).  As discussed in the introduction, Australia has achieved a 
relatively ‘open’ economy with two decades of market deregulation and financial 
liberalisation that has affected its links of trade though did not do anything for the 
grain and resource exports.18  For foreign multinationals, tradelinks refer to the 
ease of doing business in Australia with homebase and third markets.  Keiretsu 
system of domestic and global vertical/horizontal links between the Japanese 
firms is one of the organisational/ locational/internalisation advantages 
indigenous to Japan.  In Japan's history the existence of giant manufacturing and 
trading firms and keiretsu systems positively impacted on its technology and 
managerial transfers.19  "Large firms and a high degree of market concentration 
tend to lead to a great flurry of 'improvement invention', incremental technical 
change centred on the adaptation or diffusion of existing technology" (Inkster 
1996: 50).  Australia does not have a market to match the scale of Japan's to allow 
the realisation of the full benefits of the incoming technology transfers.  However, 
strong links have long been established between the components of Japanese 
keiretsu as well as among the different keiretsu, in their investments, in Australia 
(Edgington 1987: 19).  This in turn assists the fuller utilisation of intra-market and 
inter-market links.  The survey results show in Chart 2 that the marketing and 
sales sector firms has the highest level of satisfaction (84%) that is followed by the 
manufacturing and assembly sector (80%) and service sector (70%).20  Marketing 
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and sales sector result is close to the manufacturing and assembly sector, which is 
possibly due to the higher volume of usage of the links by the two sectors. 
      
Union-management relations  
 
The literature on Japanese management and its transfer to overseas Japanese 
production units, in the EU, the USA and Australia, had its peak in the 1980s 
though it is still the most relevant school on contemporary blue collar  (and to 
some extent while-collar) work practices.  Global restructuring of the financial, 
manufacturing and trade links reshaped the political economy Australia and 
Japan the juxtaposition of which is reflected in the employee composition of the 
Japanese MNEs in Australia (Bayari 2001a).  The surveys of the Japanese MNEs in 
Australia in the 1980s consistently emphasised union-management relations in 
which the MNE satisfaction was found to be lacking (JETRO 1989).  The most 
disastrous example of Japanese MNEs’ labour troubles in Australia in the 1980s, 
which is now interpreted as more of a failure to create a hybrid management 
structure, involved a subsidiary firm’s (from the Toyota group companies) newly 
opened state of the art manufacturing plant in Australia that soon shut down 
permanently (Graen et al. 1999: 90).  The research into Japanese MNEs in the early 
1990s drew attention to improved management-union relations in the surveyed 
Japanese MNEs (Jackson 1991, Yamanaka 1991).  By the late 1990s similar surveys 
of Japanese MNEs in Australia frequently focused on measuring the success in 
implanting the work practices and organisational characteristics readily identified 
with, though no longer exclusive to, the Japanese management school (Bayari 
2001a).  Successive research findings showed that the most elements of the work 
practices transferred from the MNEs Japan operations were operating with 
varying levels of success that appeared infinitely higher than the experiences of 
the 1980s (Purcell 1999).   The responses to this question of the present survey 
have to be viewed in context of several management initiatives in the workplace 
that, in the last two decades, created procedures and processes that seemingly do 
not directly challenge the union authority but nevertheless function for the benefit 
of the accumulation process.  One such process in Australia has been the 
management led ‘responsible autonomy’ mechanisms in the 1990s, which the 1995 
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) found to be most 
successful in workplaces dominated by managerial and professional staff, and 
mostly at workplaces in non-manufacturing sectors (Harley 1998: 277).  A prior 
study has shown that manufacturing sector placed more significance on ‘work 
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organisation’ and ‘management style’ as competitive advantages than the service 
sector (Purcell et al. 1999: 75).  In Chart 2, it can be observed that the most satisfied 
sector on the issue of ‘union-management relations’ is the service sector and the 
least satisfied is the manufacturing and assembly (69%), with marketing and sales 
sector (83%) falling in between, which confirms the results of the 1995 AWIRS 
survey.21  The order of satisfaction found in the present survey in turn confirms 
the order of the level of unionisation in the respective sectors that was covered 
previously (Bayari 2001a).  That is the manufacturing sector being most unionised 
and the service sector as the sector with the lowest levels of union membership 
and the least number of unions present (Bayari 2001a).  In the results presented 
herein, this trend is expressed in mean scores across the firms that are categorised 
according to their year of entry to the market and staff numbers, which is 
presented in the Tables 2 and 3.  Another point of interest is how the respondents 
differentiated between two variables IR (low satisfaction) and UNION-
MANAGEMENT (high satisfaction).  The surveyed firms are either by and large 
happy with the union-management relations or are less willing to report their 
dissatisfaction with it than they are willing to state dissatisfaction with industrial 
relations. 
 
Size of the Australian market 
 
Market size is one of the variables that about which the respondents were 
relatively more capable of being objective.  This is naturally due to the 
impossibility of altering it with any strategy or plan other than choosing the mode 
of investment i.e. direct investment, licensing or importing.  Japanese MNEs with 
larger stock of technological knowledge have a lower proportion of production in 
developing countries, but have a higher proportion in developed countries (Fukao 
et al. 1994: 1). However it has also been shown that Japanese foreign investment 
has a positive relation to the size of the market in the host country (Amano et al. 
1997: 13). This highlights the disadvantage that Australia has had historically with 
its small market size. As a result, the size of the Australian market is the least 
satisfying aspect of doing business in Australia for the respondents with 85% of 
the Japanese firms reporting being unsatisfied (Chart 2-All Sectors Combined).  
The nearest low score to the variable of MARKET was GST, a recent business 
factor that is in a different league. Hence, the percentage of the satisfaction with 
MARKET variable was low for all the sectors with manufacturing and assembly 
firms coming first (17%) followed by the service sector (12%).  The reason for the 
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satisfaction level being the highest for the manufacturing and assembly sector is 
the fact that these companies have been in Australia to serve the local market by 
producing here and having been well aware of the possible sales volumes prior to 
the new era of tariff lowering.  The fact that the satisfaction was also low, among 
all other variables, for the marketing and sales firms (16%) signifies that the 
market size determines the volume of the goods and services marketed and sold 
even for the firms that do not produce locally.  Hence, the costs that are associated 
with this activity would have been less had the market been larger. 
    
Federal support for industry and exports 
 
The level of satisfaction with this variable is higher than that of TARIFFS, 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, MARKET, GST and DISTANCE for all the companies 
(Chart 2-All Sectors Combined).  When divided among sectors there is little 
variance.  Manufacture and assembly firms (62%) appear to be more satisfied 
while the 60 per cent of the marketing and sales sector firms and the 57 per cent of 
the companies of the service were satisfied (Chart 2).  FEDERAL SUPPORT refers 
to the Australian government's historical reluctance to offer incentives to MNEs 
that has to be analysed in context of the MNE behaviour and the size of the 
Australian market.  MNEs can have a tendency to service foreign markets from 
their domestic plants instead of the foreign subsidiaries (Townsend 1988: 330).  
Certain conditions have to be present for foreign investment to take place, as 
observed in MNE theories. However the market size plays a distinct and 
undeniable role in the MNE behaviour, as it has been determined by the 
numerous surveys of the Japanese MNEs in Australia (see Bayari 2001b for a 
summary).  As per the Australian market, in the late 1950 Australia produced and 
exported more vehicles than Japan.  Even if the economic expansion in Japan had 
not taken place to the extent it did, the sheer size of the Japanese domestic market 
would have meant that Japan would have eventually been a much larger 
producer and exporter than Australia.  In line with the OLI equation of the 
Dunning's eclectic paradigm, Japanese MNEs entered Australia to get behind the 
tariff barriers, following the fdi by the MNEs from the UK and the USA (Beeson 
1997, Edgington 1990, Nicholas et al 1996b).  Australian government has refrained 
from developing comprehensive national agenda on production, as well as 
agriculture which is most apparent in its powerlessness to fight of agricultural 
produce subsidy of the USA.  Agriculture and dairy have come to be considered 
in the framework of ecology, not as merely objective processes that feed off from 
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the necessity of human subsistence.  Industrial production is also a process that is 
a determinant of the economic independence and strength of a nation.  Australia's 
industrial production has been historically based on import of labour and capital.  
The latter was often obtained through the means of foreign investment from 
foreign MNEs which has been covered elsewhere (Bayari 2000a, Bayari 2000b, 
Bayari 1999).  Government policy for assisting industrial production is the crux of 
the rapid industrialisation of the ASEAN nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and the newly industrialised countries (NICs) such as South 
Korea and Taiwan.  Government assistance for industrial has not been on the 
agenda for almost two decades in Australia (Beeson 1997, and Sheenan et al. 
1994).   
 
GST 
 
The structure of the world economy has historically determined more than just the 
interaction of global producers, trades and investors; it also claims the authorship 
of social movements and governance (Polanyi 1957).  Governing the economy 
through taxation is the last vestige of the national policymakers that are 
themselves ruled externally by the global financiers.  GST is a new factor for all 
business and the consumers in Australia.  Comparative effects of the introduction 
of goods and services tax on companies in Australia and Japan has been 
previously covered (Blount 2001).  Goods and services tax is a significant business 
factor for MNEs that view it a new cost of doing business that is also expensive to 
administer (Personal interview 2001).  This variable has the second lowest 
satisfaction level reported (GST 39%) after the market size (MARKET 15%) (Chart 
2-All Sectors Combined).  As seen in Chart 2 all sectors were dissatisfied with 
GST, in the order of marketing and sales (43%), manufacturing and assembly 
(41%) and service sector (29%) which has the least level of satisfaction indicating 
the effect of the new tax on the sector. 
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Lack of tariff protection for products  
Tariff policy and federal assistance cannot be considered separately from each 
other as the reduction in the former increases the costs for the latter.  Industry 
assistance encourages retooling and reinvestment among manufacturers who 
wish to stay competitive against imports that rise as tariffs fall.  The most 
significant development on tariff protection for manufacturing in Australia is the 
incoming policy of tariff freeze for the auto industry until 2010 when there will be 
a drop to 5 per cent from the current 15 per cent.   This has been the major 
preoccupation of the government on the tariff front.  On the assistance side $2 
billion is injected into the sector by the federal government (Lewis 2002: 1).  Such a 
large scale intervention highlights the importance of the 55,000 employed by the 
gang of four, GMH, Ford, Toyota, Mitsubishi and the hundreds of component 
manufacturers in the country in the $17 billion a year industry.  One of the reasons 
is that automobiles have become a more common consumer item in Australia.  For 
every two people there is a car on the road today compared to for every 3.3 people 
in 1971 (ABS 2002).  Increasing exports by Toyota, GMH and Mitsubishi are also a 
factor for the recent industry assistance through funds and tariff freeze 
(McDonald and MacFarlane 2002 2).  All these draw a somewhat optimistic 
scenario of moving from a protected industry to an export industry after years of 
uncertainty and declarations from Mitsubishi of its imminent exit from the sector, 
following in the footsteps of Nissan.  18.5% of the sample in this survey was firms 
in automotive and auto-parts manufacturing.  The lowering of tariffs in Australia 
has undercut the Japanese carmakers in Australia and the Japanese importers 
such as Nissan who used to manufacture in Australia.  Ford and GMH now bring 
their models from Europe with favourable exchange rates against euro, 
undercutting Japanese imports and Australian produced Japanese models on 
price (Gotting 2003: 25).  Finally, in terms of the survey results presented in 
CHART 2, 61 per cent of the marketing and sales firms and 39 per cent of the 
manufacturing and assembly firms were satisfied with the TARIFFS policy which 
adds up to 38 per cent when all the firms in total (Chart 2-All Sectors Combined) 
which puts this variable between MARKET and DISTANCE.22 
 
Distance between Australia and export markets  
FDI is a question of net costs and benefits of overseas involvement (Hutchinson 
and Nicholas 1994). What are the factors that can compensate the distance of 
Australia from the rest of the world?  Possibly none.  Australia is a small market 
with mainly resource and land based industries, at a great distance from 
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everywhere that compounds the problems associated with the other factors 
discussed herein.  It is a market with limited consumption volumes, with no 
apparent advantage for production of low-cost export-oriented manufacturing, 
with over 70 per cent of its GDP formed by service industries.  The pattern of 
Japanese investment in Australia was set in the 1960s in such a background with 
fluctuating shares of service, trade and manufacturing sectors (Sekine 1991).  
Japanese investment in Australia has been biased against manufacturing 
(Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994).  The reasons for this have been covered above 
and elsewhere (Bayari 2001a).  While wage rates and industrial relations issues 
were reported to be low ranking factors in the initial Japanese investment, 
according to an earlier survey, highest ranks were given to import duties, 
transport costs, government policy, non-tariff barriers and energy costs 
(Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994: 8-9).  DISTANCE variable is a component of the 
transport costs.  In this survey’s results marketing and sales firms were the most 
satisfied (58%), followed by service sector (50%) and manufacturing and assembly 
firms (23%).  Elsewhere, the primary hurdles for Japanese investment in Australia 
were identified by the Japanese MNEs as high local taxes, lack of government 
incentives, small size of the market, high port and shipping costs, lack of industry 
policy, physical distance from export markets (EIU 1996).  Psychic or the 
perceived distance also was mentioned (Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994; Nicholas 
et al 1996a) as an impediment to fdi.  "Psychic distance is a disadvantage related to 
differences in customs, culture, legal and government system and business 
practice between the Japanese and Australian economies (Hutchinson and 
Nicholas 1994: 9).  Psychic distance is also included in location specific variables in 
Dunning's eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1988a: 27).  The fact that the Japanese MNEs 
have been operating in Australia for close to a century it may be suggested that 
psychic distance between the two will be relatively lessened in importance (CEDA 
1997).  The changes in the combination of business factors can also serve to 
increase the distance.   
 
Conclusion 
The paper has discussed ten business and economic factors that affect fdi and 
made several observations on the divergence and convergence between the 
industries on their reported satisfaction.  The paper has covered previous research 
and developments in the discussion of each factor while presenting the present 
research findings.  The results displayed in Chart 2-All Sectors Combined are 
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unlikely to be significantly different for some of the factors in a future surveys.  
They may also be totally irrelevant in instances where the firms with export 
activity may cease to exist in the near future.  As discussed above it is precisely 
the manufacturing and assembly sector that has serious misgivings about the 
more crucial factors such as TARIFFS and TRANSPORT.  As shown in Chart 2 
there is no continuous trend among the three sectors on the reported satisfaction 
with the economic and business factors.  Service sector has the lowest levels of 
satisfaction with GST, FEDSUPPORT, UNION-MANAGEMENT, TRADELINKS 
and INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.  Manufacturing and assembly firms, on the other 
hand, have the lowest levels of satisfaction with TARIFFS, DISTANCE and 
TRANSPORT.  MARKET is where the three sectors converge in their reported low 
levels of satisfaction though they come close to converging on FEDSUPPORT and 
UNION-MANAGEMENT.  The widest divergence is on SUPPORT and 
TRANSPORT for the three sectors.  The factors analysed in this survey are not 
exhaustive. For example currency fluctuation would be an obvious variable that 
could be tested but it may not necessarily address the varying levels of objectivity 
offered by a combination such as the sectors and tariff policy or market size.   
Further, the factors that cover labour-management issues have a long history 
behind them and have been tested by successive surveys hence they need to be 
included in future research.  Moreover, the issues that relate to the necessary 
support from the HQ of foreign companies have a great deal of relevance as the 
discussions of globalisation and its effects on business fill volumes.  As the 
Japanese MNEs and their global activities remain as significant as ever, the trends 
that the present paper argues to have detected present a negative picture for the 
Australian economy in which the Japanese firms are the third biggest investors.     
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1  The survey data
 
and
 
statistical information: The data on the Japanese companies, which this paper 
uses, was collected throughout 2001 via mail out of a questionnaire with the assistance of Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Sydney and Japan External Trade Organisation, Sydney.  Sixty-five replied by fax 
from a total of 240 companies contacted through the membership list of Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Sydney. Hence, this paper is based on the survey, which canvassed the owners/managers of the 
companies on ten locational factors.  Survey data consists of 18 manufacturing and assembly, 27 marketing 
and sales and 20 service sector companies.  The companies are MNEs, Japanese companies’ subsidiaries 
and branches/representatives of Japanese firms in Australia.  The survey asked them if they were satisfied 
with the following ten factors: ‘Support from your parent company in Japan’-‘SUPPORT’, ‘Transport in and out 
of Australia’-‘TRANSPORT’, ‘Australian industrial relations’-‘INDUSTRIAL R.’,  ‘Australia's economic and trade 
links with other nations’-‘TRADELINKS’, ‘Union-management relations in your company’-‘UNION-
MANAGEMENT’, ‘Size of the Australian market’-‘MARKET’, ‘Federal support for your industry and exports’-
‘FEDSUPPORT’, ‘GST (goods and services tax)’, ‘Lack of tariff protection for your products’-‘TARIFF’ and 
‘Distance between Australia and your export markets’-‘DISTANCE’.
 
As the data consists of three types of 
companies, manufacturing and assembly sector, marketing and sales sector and service sector companies it 
is an exploratory data that is not tested using any statistical measurement tools and instead crosstabulation of 
results are provided in percentage terms.  Hence the paper does not make any claims about the adequacy of 
the sample size for statistical testing.  The data on which the arguments of the paper are based is illustrative 
that is too small for hypothetical testing, for example, of relationships between variables.  The paper hence 
uses the data for illustrative purposes.  The specifics of the data are provided progressively in table and chart 
formats in the development of the argument. 
 
2  The interaction, between ownership advantages and several locational factors, has been covered in 
respect to the Japanese business in Australia with an earlier data set (Nicholas et al. 1996: 14-16). 
 
3  Australia's top two exporters are Mitsui & Co and Mitsubishi Australia general trading companies that 
are also the two of the top twenty Australian companies.  Based on export performance the top seven Japan 
trading companies in Australia are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Itochu, Marubeni, Sumitomo, Nissho Iwai and 
Kanematsu.  These companies exported more than one fifth of Australia's total merchandise exports in 1995, 
equalling A$15.1 billion, which was more than Australia's total exports to Japan (BRW/EFIC 1997: 54).  They 
handle the export of Australian coal, iron ore, oil and gas, nonferrous metals, wool, bricks and pavers, motor 
vehicle components, woodchips, salt and processed foods (BRW/EFIC 1997: 54).  
 
4  However from early 1980s to early 1990s Japanese MNEs' new fdi rose from about 20% to nearly 30 
% of the Australia's total inflow of fdi (Drysdale 1993). 
 
3  (EAAU 1997) has 1995 data charts that break down the Japanese investment in Australia by industry 
which is not discussed here as comparison is not possible due to lack of current data.  
 
6  Australian investment levels overseas were $458.8 billion in the same period and equity has been 
the main form of Australian investment abroad during the past decade.  Japan was the fourth major 
destination ($20 billion or 4% of the total Australian investment). 
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7  An MNE can be either distinctly producing or trading, or both.  In Australia, for example there are 
Japanese sogo shosha that operate in woodchipping, mining as well as agriculture, livestock, dairy, rice 
farming, sake brewing.   
 
8  Percentages are rounded. 
 
9  In manufacturing, the most direct economic benefit from Japan is often in form of technology transfer 
via licensing by Australian companies.  (Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994: 14)  Japanese manufacturing MNEs 
in Australia, although limited in number and size, are from high R & D sectors and spend more in Australia on 
R & D than non - Japanese MNEs and Australian corporations.  (Nicholas et al. 1996a: 16).  Previously the 
transfer of Japanese technology to Australia was discussed briefly by the author (Bayari 2001a) and it was 
stated that the US and UK MNEs transfer much higher ratio of technology via investment in Australia, even 
though it is not the state of the art level the Japanese MNEs offer. 
 
10  See Footnote 1 for the definition
 
and the individual discussion of the variables. 
 
11  Missing responses and the responses from the companies that found the factors not relevant to their 
activity are excluded from all the figures in the Chart 2.  
 
12  Variable values: (1) =’satisfied’, (2) =’not applicable’, (3) =’unsatisfied’. 
 
13 1 for no importance, 2 low importance, 3 medium importance, 4 high importance (Purcell et al. 
1996a: 75). 
 
14 In the present survey service sector includes firms in banking, insurance, sogo shosha, tourism and 
IT. 
 
15 Japanese MNEs are not the only ones who use fully owned subsidiaries to market and sell their 
products instead of distributors.  For example, European carmakers use the same system in Australia to 
market their cars and even Ford and GMH import their models from Europe (Gotting 2003: 25). 
 
16  TRANSPORT and TRADELINKS variables were the top three in satisfaction levels for all sectors 
according to the survey results.  This outcome highlights the fact that the firms have high level dependency on 
them for their business activities with goods having to be transported and imported into Australia at 
competitive price, with competitive distribution links, all in the framework of HQ support. 
 
17  Having said that it also needs to be restated that Australian economy unlike most other national 
economies was founded and is maintained by the import of labour and capital. 
 
18  In the "Openness to Foreign Influences Rating" Australia is in the fourth place after Taiwan, 
Philippines, Hong Kong.  The rest are Singapore, USA, Thailand, China, and UK. Germany. Indonesia. 
Malaysia. France, Japan and South Korea (WEF 2000). 
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19 Keiretsu networks can also work to the benefit of foreign investors.  In 1999 when Renault took a 37 
per cent in Nissan it gave the European firm access to Nissan’s Asia Pacific network, when coupled with the 
rise in yen, has allowed Renault to boost sales (Gotting 2003: 25). 
   
20  Interestingly a previous survey suggested that service (financial) sector firms placed higher 
importance on the firm being a part of the world-wide operations than the manufacturing firms with tourism 
firms having placed the least importance on the variable (Purcell et al. 1999: 75). 
 
21  The number of responses from the service sector firms was too small.  As only the ‘satisfied’ and 
‘unsatisfied’ responses were considered the level of satisfaction appears high. 
 
22  The number of responses from the service sector firms was too small.  As only the ‘satisfied’ and 
‘unsatisfied’ responses were considered the level of satisfaction appears low. 
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